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Beeson: Taxation - Requirement for Business Bad Debt Deductions
CASE COMMENTS

Although the immediate issue of Gulbankian concerned only one
area of legal ethics, the case is indicative of problems that occur when
courts act in their role as disciplinarian of the legal profession. First,
the courts must remain cognizant that attorneys receive guidance for
their professional conduct from the American Bar Association,
through its published opinions, as well as from the courts themselves.
Also, courts that have adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility should explain and supplement it whenever the need and opportunity arise. This technique is preferable to the course of conduct
adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Although
the Code of Professional Responsibility is less skeletal than its predecessor, it is a new body of law with little judicial interpretation of
its provisions. The court in Gulbankian attempted to establish needed
guidelines for the bench and bar. It neglected, however, to define
clearly the important concepts of solicitation and conscious influencing. Finally, attorneys can avoid some problems of misapplication of
the Code by appropriate preventive action. The attorneys in Gulbankian might have prevented the whole question of impropriety, with all
its damaging effects on their professional stature, by having their clients manifest in one of several manners their voluntary intentions to
have the attorneys serve as attorney for probate or executrix.
Bert Michael Whorton

Taxation - Requirement for Business Bad Debt Deductions
Taxpayer owned 44 percent of the stock in a construction corporation that he founded jointly with his son-in-law and in which he
held the position of president at a salary of $12,000 per year. His
total yearly income from the corporation and other sources amounted
to approximately $40,000. Taxpayer claimed $162,000 as a business
bad debt deduction on his 1962 income tax return. He had paid this
amount as indemnity to a casualty company that fulfilled bid and performance bonds when the construction corporation defaulted on its
contracts. The resulting debt of the corporation to taxpayer became
worthless when the corporation went into receivership. The Internal
[lit should be clearly understood that in disciplinary proceedings for
disbarment or suspending or annuling the license of an attorney at
law the action taken must depend upon the facts and circumstances
in each particular case and it is not intended by the decision in this
proceeding to establish any uniform or particular type of disciplinary action for any given case.
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Revenue Code provides that a business bad debt may be deducted
from ordinary income; a nonbusiness bad debt must be treated as a
short-term capital loss, which is less favorable to the taxpayer.' The
regulations provide that a business bad debt is one that has a "proximate relation" to the taxpayer's trade or business. 2 Taxpayer maintained that the requirement of "proximate relation" was satisfied if a
"significant" motivation for making the indemnity payment was to
protect his salaried position as president of the corporation.
The district court, in a jury trial, allowed the deduction based
on the "significant" motivation standard.' The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, reversed, judgment n.o.v. for the United States ordered. When
a taxpayer seeks to deduct a loss as a business bad debt, the proper
test of whether the bad debt has a "proximate relation" to the taxpayer's trade or business is that of "dominant" motivation and mere
CODE of 1954, § 166 provides:
Bad debts.
(a) General rule.(1) Wholly worthless debts. -There shall be allowed as a
deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.

'INT. REv.

(d) Nonbusiness debts. (1) General rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation (A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness
debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within
the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a
loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital
asset held for not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. - For purposes of paragraph
(1), the term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than (A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred
in
2 the taxpayer's trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b) (1960) provides:
(b) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes of section 166 and
this section, a nonbusiness debt is any debt other than(2) A debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.
The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question
of fact in each particular case ....
For purposes of subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to be determined
by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming
worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxayer. If that relation

is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which
the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the
debt comes within the exception provided by that subparagraph.
3 Generes v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9754 (E.D. La. 1967).
4 United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
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"significant" motivation will not suffice. United States v. Generes, 405
U.S. 93 (1972).s
The issue presented in Generes has been a prolific source of litigation primarily because of the vague wording of the regulations. They
provide that for a bad debt loss to be fully deductible from ordinary
income as a business bad debt, it must bear a "proximate relation"
to "the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless." '6 Specifically, the Court
in Generes was called upon to decide whether "proximate relation"
requires that the taxpayer incurring the bad debt loss have as his
"dominant" motivation the desire to protect or further his employment or business, or whether this desire must be simply a "significant"
motivation.
Prior to Generes, a conflict existed between holdings in the Second and Seventh Circuits. In Weddle v. Commissioner,7 where the
taxpayer was both president of a corporation and its principal stockholder, the Second Circuit adopted the "significant" motivation test
for determining whether the loss could be deducted as a business bad
debt. In referring to the regulations use of the term "proximate" to
describe the relation the debt must bear to the taxpayer's business,
the court made an analogy to tort law. It reasoned that where there
are several causes for a particular harm, any one of them may be
found proximate although perhaps less important than other causes. 8
Applying this tort concept of proximate cause to the regulations' use
of the term "proximate relation," the Second Circuit concluded that
the bad debt loss could be proximately related to the taxpayer's trade
or business without having been motivated primarily by business reasons. Hence the proper standard would be one of "significant" rather
than "dominant" motivation.9
In his concurring opinion in Weddle, Judge Lumbard advocated
the "dominant" motivation test. He noted that unless the taxpayer's
salary is so small as to be valueless, its preservation will be on his
mind as he makes the loan, regardless that his investment is of far
greater worth. The question of whether a "significant" motivation is
present where the taxpayer is both an investor and a salaried em5
Petition for rehearing by Generes was denied by the Supreme Court on
March
27, 1972. 405 U.S. 1033 (1972).
6
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1960).
7 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
8Id.at 851.
9Id.
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ployee would invariably be answered in the affirmative.' 0 Stating his
belief that there is no accurate basis for determining the relative percentages of business and nonbusiness motivation, Judge Lumbard advocated the "dominant" motivation standard as the only workable
test. I
In 1969 the Seventh Circuit, following the same reasoning as
Judge Lumbard, adopted the "dominant" motivation test in Niblock
v. Commissioner.2 The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Whipple v. Commissioner'3 for the proposition that the regulations
contemplate a meaningful distinction between bad debt losses connected with the taxpayer's business and those concerned with the
business of the corporation. Feeling a clear distinction essential, the

Seventh Circuit held the "dominant" motivation standard to be "the
only test that will inject sufficient certainty into the interpretation of
section 166 .... ,,'4
Only the Fifth Circuit specifically decided be16
tween the Second and Seventh Circuit tests,'- and that decision
brought about granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
In adopting the test of "dominant" motivation in Generes, the
Supreme Court provided a clear standard for lower courts to follow
and further clarified a confusing area of income tax law. The result
was also in line with earlier Supreme Court decisions in Putnam v.
Commissioner'7 and Whipple v. Commissioner.8
In Putnam, taxpayer organized a corporation, supplied the necessary capital, and proceeded to loan money to the corporation and
guarantee various debts. At the time of the guarantee the corporate
entity still existed even though it had ceased doing business and had
[Old. at 852.
11
Id. The Supreme Court incorporated Judge Lumbard's reasoning into its
decision in Generes. 405 U.S. at 104.
12417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
13373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963).
14417 F.2d at 1187.
IsIn a case arising within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction, after the court
of appeals had already adopted the "significant" motivation standard, the Tax
Court felt obliged to follow that test although voicing its agreement with the
"dominant" motivation standard. Smith v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 260 (1970).
Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420, 422-23 (8th Cir. 1968), and Lundgren
v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1967), offer implied support of
the "significant" motivation standard. In Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d
461, 463 (3d Cir. 1970), the court held the taxpayer had failed to produce
sufficient evidence to establish even a "significant" business motivation and,
therefore, it was unnecessary to decide between the two standards.
16United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
17352 U.S. 82 (1956).
18373 U.S. 193 (1963).
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disposed of its assets. The Court was faced with the issue of whether

taxpayer's loss was fully deductible as a loss "incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with [his] trade
or business"' 9 or whether it was a bad debt 0 and, hence, deductible
only as a short-term capital loss. It determined that a loss due to the
inability of a guarantor to recover from the debtor is by its nature a
bad debt.2 'The Court further determined that such a bad debt was

not connected with the taxpayer's business and could be deducted
only as a nonbusiness debt within the meaning of 1939 Code section
23(k) (4) [predecessor of 1954 Code section 166(d) (1) (b)]. Here,
however, the taxpayer was not an employee but a mere investor.
In Whipple the Court sought to define the difficult concept of
"proximate relation." The holding pointed out that the 1942 amendment to section 23(k) of the 1939 Code [predecessor of 1954 Code
section 166(d)] was intended to allow full deduction of a bad debt
only where the debt was proximately connected with an enterprise
recognized as a trade or business by the income tax laws. 21 The Court
noted that this concept does not apply to all income-producing activities, 24 and denied the taxpayer's contention that investing in a corporation and performing certain managerial services constituted a trade
25

or business.

A problem has arisen in cases such as Generes where the stockholder is also an employee of the corporation. 26 The issue is whether
'9 INT. Rnv. CODE Of 1939, ch. 1, § 23 (e)(2), 53 Stat. 13 (now Ir.
REv.20CODE Of 1954, § 165(c)(2)).
INT. REv. CODE Of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(k)(4), 56 Stat. 821, amending
INT. REv. CODE of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(k), 53 Stat. 13 (now INT. REV. CODE of
1954 § 166(d) (1)(B)).
21352 U.S. at 85.
221d.at 92-93.
23 Id. at 91. The 1942 amendment was intended to narrow the range of
what was deductible as a business bad debt. It was an integral part of the
Revenue Act of 1942, a comprehensive tax program designed to raise revenue
necessary to conduct World War II. By this amendment Congress narrowed
section 23(k) to exclude full deduction of bad debts arising from the same
source.
24
1n Whipple, the taxpayer was controlling stockholder and manager of
several corporations. He sold certain equipment owned individually by him,
leased a plant on land owned individually by him, and made a loan to one of
the corporations. The Court held that the debts arising from these transactions
were not business bad debts because they did not result from a trade or
business of the taxpayer. 373 U.S. at 201.
25 This followed long-established decisions that set forth the principle that
the identities of corporations and their shareholders are separate and the business of one is not the business of the other. See Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212 (1941); Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Burnet v.
Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932); Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932).
26 There were 179 such cases pending at the appellate conference level of
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the loan from which the bad debt arose was made to protect the taxpayer's investment, his salaried position, or both. And, if both, how
may the courts determine which takes precedence?27
If, as the Supreme Court decided in Whipple, a loss arising out
of an investment is not, standing alone, a business bad debt loss, then
the Court in Generes reasoned that it would be strange to allow the
deduction where the taxpayer is an employee of the corporation, but
is primarily motivated by his investment interests. 8 The Court felt
that "dominant" is a more precise term than "signficant" - more
easily applied and more in the spirit, if not the letter, of the regula29
tion.
Obviously the decision in Generes creates a difficult situation
for a particular class of taxpayers. It is now virtually impossible for
an employee-investor whose salary from the corporation is of less
value than his investment to claim a business bad debt deduction for
a loan or indemnification that becomes worthless. Therefore, most taxpayers who lend money to a corporation in which they hold both
stock and a salaried position could lose the value of the loan if the
corporation fails and also suffer serious tax consequences. In short,
the decision in Generes appears to have largely foreclosed the avenue
of full deductibility from ordinary income to taxpayers who fall
within this dual classification.
There appears no compelling reason other than consistency for
the Supreme Court's decision in Generes. Had the Court chosen to
construe the language of the regulations strictly, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the "significant" motivation standard would have
been adopted. The use of the word "proximate" originated in tort
law, so it might reasonably be assumed that analogies to tort law were
considered when the regulations were drafted. Since the accepted
the Internal Revenue Service at the time the petition for certiorari was filed
in Generes. Brief for the Petitioner at 14, United States v. Generes, 405 U.S.

93 (1972).
27

The Code does not provide for a division of bad debt losses into portions related to the employment of the taxpayer and portions related to the
investment. Although both business and nonbusiness motivations are present,
the debt must be deducted entirely as a business bad debt or entirely as a nonbusiness bad debt. INT. RPv. CODE of 1954, § 166(d).
28405

U.S. at 104.

Id. at 104-05. Implied in the Court's decision in Generes is the idea that
the "significant" motivation standard would almost invariably result in a decision for the taxpayer, even where little business motivation is present.
Strangely enough, in Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963),
which established the "significant" motivation standard, the decision went
against the taxpayer.
29
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meaning of "proximate cause" does not exclude substantial but nondominant causes, 0 a strict interpretation of the regulations might reasonably lead one to arrive at the "significant" motivation test as that
intended by the draftsmen.
The Court, however, has opted for a decision consistent with its
own earlier holdings. The decision is justifiable since "dominant" motivation is a more precise test. Perhaps the major importance of the
decision in Generes is not that the Court adopted one test over the
other, but that it did adopt a test by which similar cases can be decided consistently by lower courts in the future.
Joseph S. Beeson

U.C.C.

- Statute of Limitations - Conflicts Between Personal
Injury and Sales Contract Statutes of Limitations

In October, 1966, Roy Lee Heavaer purchased a trailer and
eight new Uniroyal truck tires. Mr. Heavner was operating this vehicle in April of the following year when an accident occurred resulting
in damage to the trailer and severe injuries to himself. In September,
1970, Heavner brought an action against Uniroyal, the tire manufacturer, and Pullman, the seller of the trailer, asserting that both
were liable for breach of express and implied warranties.' Uniroyal
and Pullman moved to have the personal injury action dismissed on
the grounds it was barred by the two year New Jersey statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. 2 Heavner contended that he
30

Professor Prosser points out that instructions to the jury that they must

find defendant's conduct to be the "sole cause" of the injury in order to give
relief should be and are strongly condemned as improper. Damages may be
apportioned between separate causes according to the degree to which they
contributed to the harm. Although one cause may have been responsible for a
greater degree of injury, each cause is proximate if each alone would have
caused the injury to occur. W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th
ed. 1971).
1Heavner also sought relief on the grounds of strict liability in tort, strict

liability
for misrepresentation, and negligence.
2
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952) provides:

"Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced
within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."
This is similar to W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie, 1966), which
provides a two year limitation on the commencement of actions to recover for
personal injury but does not require the injury to be the result of the wrongful
act, default, or neglect of another.
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